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THE NEW ORIGINALISM AND THE FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION 
Andrew Kent* 
INTRODUCTION 
The influence of originalism in the legal academy is large and growing.  
And the U.S. Supreme Court has relied heavily on originalism in certain 
domestic, individual rights cases like District of Columbia v. Heller.1  But 
foreign affairs is different.  In that area, originalism is, as Ingrid Wuerth has 
observed, “generally speaking, not the way courts or the Executive Branch 
and Congress actually interpret the Constitution.”2 
In fact, there are dozens of important Supreme Court decisions on 
constitutional foreign affairs issues that pay little or no attention to the 
original meaning of specific textual provisions of the Constitution.3  The 
most influential legal framework for modern foreign affairs decisionmaking 
is Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, which begins with an attack on the utility and possibility of 
 
*  Professor, Fordham Law School; Faculty Advisor, Center on National Security at 
Fordham Law School.  Thanks to Corey Brettschneider, Martin Flaherty, Tom Lee, Ethan 
Leib, and Benjamin Zipursky for helpful comments on an earlier version, and to Mike 
Schwartz for research assistance. 
 1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 
659 (2009) (calling Heller “the most thoroughgoing originalist opinion in the Court’s 
history”).  For other Supreme Court decisions in domestic cases relying substantially on 
originalist evidence, see, for example, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–56 (2004) 
(interpreting the Confrontation Clause). 
 2. Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 5, 9 n.19 
(2008). 
 3. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Zivotofsky ex rel. 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 
396 (2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Breard v. Greene, 
523 U.S. 371 (1998); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 
U.S. 654 (1981); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); 
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44 
(1958); United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952); Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United 
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 
481 (1931); MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 
U.S. 297 (1909); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 
(1900); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 
(1891); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 
U.S. 581 (1889); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 
603 (1850). 
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originalism4 and proceeds to lay out a decisional schema based on 
functional considerations and realism about contemporary politics and 
institutional dynamics.5  Even when the Court purports to spend some time 
on text and history in foreign affairs cases, as it did in Boumediene v. Bush6 
or United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,7 for example, it often skips 
any sustained textual analysis, references Founding-era history at a very 
high level of generality, and ends up finding that nonhistorical 
considerations such as precedent, functionalism, and abstract constitutional 
principles are decisive.  Constitutional interpretation by the political 
branches is often nonoriginalist as well. 
Notwithstanding the relatively modest impact that originalism has in the 
governmental practice of foreign affairs law today, its prominence in legal 
scholarship and in domestic, individual rights opinions by the Supreme 
Court more than justifies spending some time thinking about challenges that 
the “new originalism”—the latest version of the originalist method—faces 
in interpreting the foreign affairs aspects of the Constitution. 
After sketching the basics of the new originalist method, I first suggest 
that new originalism struggles to decide how to handle background norms 
of the common law or the law of nations, which were understood by some 
members of the Founding generation to implicitly qualify or restrict parts of 
the constitutional text.  These issues are omnipresent in foreign affairs law 
because courts, executive officials, and other interpreters must decide 
whether the boundaries of the Constitution’s broadly written protections for 
life, liberty, and property extend to domains such as wartime or 
extraterritorial activity by the U.S. government, or to persons beyond the 
paradigm case of U.S. citizens within the United States. 
Second, I suggest that the exacting textualism practiced by many new 
originalists might only imperfectly understand certain aspects of the foreign 
affairs provisions of the Constitution.  This is because some of it was 
drafted hastily and poorly, certain important topics were seemingly not 
addressed at all, and some Founding-era interpreters understood the foreign 
affairs portions of the Constitution in a holistic manner focused on purpose 
and structure, instead of parsing text in the manner of new originalism.  
This potentially large gap between results reached by new originalism and 
 
 4. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–35 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring) (“Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they 
foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the 
dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.  A century and a half of partisan 
debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt 
quotations from respected sources on each side of any question.  They largely cancel each 
other.”). 
 5. See generally MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
53 (2007) (noting that Jackson’s opinion did not consider originalist evidence or arguments); 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Originalism in Youngstown’s Shadow, 53 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 29, 30–35 (2008) (noting the same, and also suggesting that Jackson’s functionalism 
rather than originalism is the dominant mode of separation-of-powers analysis by the 
Supreme Court today). 
 6. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 7. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
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the expectations and practices of the Founders raises questions about new 
originalism’s claim to be based on the public meaning of the text to the 
adopting generation.  And if many foreign affairs provisions of the 
Constitution have an underdeterminate original public meaning, originalism 
cannot answer many constitutional questions, and the ultimate usefulness of 
the method is called into question. 
I.  THE NEW ORIGINALISM 
Originalism is a famously diverse and evolving phenomenon that has 
proven hard for both its defenders and critics to pin down for any length of 
time.  “[A] fairly basic definition of originalism” is that it “regards the 
discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption 
as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present.”8  
The “new originalism” is not a single theory but a family of related theories 
about how to discover and apply this meaning.  I will not try to convey all 
the nuances of the debates between and among new originalists and their 
critics,9 but instead make some general comments about how I understand 
the theory. 
Because of the well-known theoretical and methodological problems 
with old originalism’s focus on either the original intent of the 
Constitution’s drafters or the original understanding of its ratifiers,10 a 
number of prominent contemporary originalists have shifted to what is 
often called new originalism or original public meaning originalism.11  This 
new originalism focuses on the objective linguistic meaning that the text of 
the Constitution would likely have had to an American audience at the time 
of adoption. 
New originalists differ in how they define the person or group whose 
usage of words and phrases is the measure of original public meaning.  For 
some, it is simply a “reasonable” or perhaps “reasonably well-informed” 
person in late eighteenth-century America.12  Lawrence Solum, one of the 
most influential theorists of new originalism, suggests that new originalism 
should look to how meaning would be understood by an “ordinary 
 
 8. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 
(2004). 
 9. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 713 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009). 
 10. See Colby, supra note 9, at 723–24 (discussing some of the criticisms); William 
Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously:  Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and 
the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 494 (2007) (same).  The dated but 
classic article in the genre is Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original 
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). 
 11. William Treanor and some others call it textualism. See Treanor, supra note 10, at 
488 n.1. 
 12. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 92 (“a reasonable listener”); Vasan Kesavan & Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 
GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132 (2003) (“a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed reader”). 
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American citizen fluent in English,” such as “farmers, seamstresses, 
shopkeepers, and even lawyers.”13  As discussed below in Part II.B.7, other 
new originalists describe somewhat different groups of language users as 
the measure of meaning. 
Excavating the public meaning of words and phrases to readers requires 
the new originalist to determine two things, says Solum:  “(1) the 
conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases that make up the 
text and (2) the rules of syntax and grammar that combine the words and 
phrases.”14  The best way to make these determinations is, again according 
to Solum, a “large-scale empirical investigation of the ways that words and 
phrases were used in ordinary written and spoken English,”15 employing 
dictionaries, grammar books, contemporary newspapers, records of how 
words were used and how terms were discussed in framing and ratification 
debates, and other sources bearing on usage.16 
Most new originalists emphasize that their search is for the inherent 
“linguistic” or “semantic” meaning of the words of the Constitution, not the 
“expectations” that the Founding-era public held or would have held about 
how the linguistic meaning of the Constitution’s words would have applied 
in practice to concrete phenomena existing at the time of adoption.17 
New originalists often posit a two-step process for answering 
constitutional questions.  First, one must perform an empirical inquiry to 
ascertain “the semantic meaning of a particular use of language in 
context.”18  This is “interpretation.”19  The second step, “construction,” is 
“the activity of applying that meaning to particular factual 
circumstances.”20  Oftentimes, the text is clear enough that the decision 
about how to apply it “follows directly” and “automatically from the 
linguistic meaning of the constitutional text,”21 and “construction will look 
indistinguishable in practice from interpretation.”22  But when the semantic 
meaning of the Constitution’s words is highly abstract or vague, 
construction becomes critical. 
 
 13. Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM:  A DEBATE 1, 3 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011).  
Historian Jack Rakove, with his tongue in cheek, calls this reader posited by some new 
originalists “Joe the Ploughman.” Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the 
Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575 
(2011). 
 14. Solum, supra note 13, at 1. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 
U. ILL. L. REV. 623, 626; Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor 
Balkin’s Originalism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 663, 669 (2009); Solum, supra note 13, at 10. 
 17. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 9, at 6–7; Solum, supra note 13, at 11; Whittington, 
supra note 8, at 611. 
 18. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 
66 (2011) (emphasis omitted). 
 19. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 20. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 21. Solum, supra note 13, at 23. 
 22. Barnett, supra note 18, at 67. 
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New originalists differ among themselves in many ways.  For example, 
they have varying interpretations of the breadth of the “construction zone,” 
(to use Solum’s phrase23), of which modalities may be used when 
construction is needed (for instance, principles underlying the text, 
precedent, history, values, functional considerations, and the like24), of 
which institutions or actors are empowered to perform construction, and of 
how binding that construction is.25 
Perhaps the biggest difference among new originalists is not theoretical, 
but comes when they apply their theories to actual constitutional text.  My 
sense is that many new originalists—for instance, John McGinnis, Steven 
Calabresi, and Michael Rappaport—believe that the text of the Constitution 
is generally quite specific and determinate, so that interpretation does not 
usually need to be supplemented by construction and a nearly complete 
originalist Constitution can be discerned.26  Other new originalists, most 
notably Jack Balkin, seem to find the text of the Constitution quite general 
and, therefore, pervasively open to nonoriginalist supplementation through 
construction.27  Some new originalists may occupy a middle ground.28  This 
difference in approach has enormous practical consequences for what the 
Constitution would look like if subject to originalist analysis and 
implementation. 
II.  NEW ORIGINALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF 
UNWRITTEN LIMITS TO THE TEXT 
A number of significant foreign relations issues turn on the relationship 
between unwritten rules of the common law and the law of nations, on the 
one hand, and the text of the Constitution on the other.  Whether and when 
 
 23. Solum, supra note 13, at 26. 
 24. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 9, at 4 (defining “constitutional construction” as 
“implementing and applying the Constitution using all of the various modalities of 
interpretation:  arguments from history, structure, ethos, consequences, and precedent”); 
Barnett, supra note 18, at 70–71 (noting that new originalism cannot answer the normative 
question of what methods of construction should be employed). See generally Ethan J. Leib, 
The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 358 (2007) 
(noting that originalists disagree “about what sorts of considerations may legitimately be 
considered at the ‘back end,’” that is, as part of what many new originalists call 
construction). 
 25. And some new originalists reject construction altogether, preferring to resolve 
ambiguity and vagueness by applying the interpretive methods and default rules that the 
adopting generation would have used. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Original Methods Originalism:  A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against 
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009). 
 26. See, e.g., Michael Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own 
Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 878 (2009) (“[M]any constitutional provisions’ 
meanings become much less vague or unspecific if the interpreter properly attends to the 
meaning such words and phrases would have had, in context, to a reasonably informed 
speaker or reader of the language, at the time of the language’s enactment as part of the 
Constitution.  That is to say, if one is a good practitioner of original-meaning textualism, the 
asserted vagueness frequently disappears.”). 
 27. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
641, 646 (2013). 
 28. See generally Barnett, supra note 18. 
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to read the text according to its apparent plain meaning or to limit or qualify 
it by reference to unwritten nonconstitutional rules is an extraordinarily 
hard question that new originalism—with its focus on the objective public 
meaning of the written text for an ordinary, reasonable person of the late 
eighteenth century—has not satisfactorily answered. 
A.  The Constitution’s Domain 
A fundamental question of U.S. foreign affairs law concerns the domain 
or the territorial and personal scope of the Constitution:  where, when, in 
what circumstances, and on whose behalf does the Constitution provide 
individual protections against the U.S. government.  These domain 
questions are complex because most of the key individual rights-protecting 
provisions of both the Bill of Rights and the original 1787 Constitution are 
written in broad terms—apparently unrestricted as to person, place, status, 
or the nature of the government activity or interest asserted.  The Due 
Process Clause, for example, provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”29  Did the 
broad and unqualified term “person” have a broad and unqualified original 
public meaning?  Or, did rules of the common law, law of nations, or other 
unwritten rules or principles implicitly limit it so that certain people in 
certain places—or certain categories of U.S. government activity—fell 
outside its protections? 
Domain questions of this type are at the heart of many classic foreign 
relations and national security disputes in U.S. history.  To be useful in the 
foreign affairs area, originalism must provide an account of what the 
relevant provisions of the Constitution, as understood by an ordinary, 
reasonable member of the adopting generation, say about the following 
controversies.  Did aliens in the United States have constitutional rights that 
the 1798 Alien Acts threatened to infringe?30  After secession and the start 
of the Civil War, did individual constitutional rights limit how the U.S. 
government conducted war against the wayward U.S. citizens of the 
Confederacy?31  Did U.S. civilians in a loyal state during the Civil War 
have constitutional rights against military trial?32  Did U.S. citizens tried by 
U.S. government consular courts in “uncivilized” foreign jurisdictions have 
constitutional rights?33  Did admitted members of the German military who 
sneaked into the United States on a sabotage mission during World War II 
have the right to habeas corpus and individual constitutional rights against 
 
 29. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also id. art. I, § 9 (“The privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended . . . .”); id. (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law 
shall be passed.”); id. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . .”); id. amend. II (“[T]he 
right of the people . . . .”); id. amend. IV (“The right of the people . . . .”); id. amend. VI (“In 
all criminal prosecutions . . . .”). 
 30. See J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 
95 GEO. L.J. 463, 527–31 (2007). 
 31. See generally Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil 
War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2010). 
 32. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 118 (1866). 
 33. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 462–65 (1891). 
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military trial?34  What about German military spies tried by a U.S. military 
tribunal in China in the aftermath of World War II and imprisoned in U.S.-
occupied Germany?35  Did noncitizens detained by the U.S. military on 
U.S.-controlled, but not sovereign, territory because they were allegedly 
combatants in terrorist groups against which Congress had authorized the 
use of military force have a right to habeas corpus or individual 
constitutional rights?36 
Old originalism privileges the intentions and understandings of Framers 
and ratifiers, many of whom were learned, legally sophisticated (if not also 
practicing lawyers), and experienced in the art of governing,37 and therefore 
reasonably likely to be aware of rules of the common law and the law of 
nations and how they would empower or restrict government and expand or 
contract otherwise broad individual rights.  My prior writings, and 
important work by Philip Hamburger, suggest that many Framers and 
ratifiers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights would have expected and 
understood that the rights-granting aspects of the Constitution would have a 
domain limited in various respects by citizenship, territorial location, and 
enemy status.38  In particular, the common law and the law of nations39 
were understood to limit the substantive and procedural rights of enemy 
aliens (nationals of an enemy nation during wartime), nonresident aliens 
even if not enemies, and enemy fighters, no matter what their territorial 
location.  The methodology of old originalism would thus tend to confirm 
that unwritten rules of common law or the law of nations could and did 
trump broad constitutional text in some instances.  For instance, James 
Madison explained to the Virginia Ratifying Convention that the broad 
language about jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution was qualified 
by the rule of the common law and the law of nations that alien enemies 
were barred from court during wartime.40 
 
 34. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1942). 
 35. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765–66 (1950). 
 36. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 
470 (2004). 
 37. For example, nearly two-thirds of the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention had 
legal training, and nearly three-quarters had served in the Continental Congress. See Sol 
Bloom, Constitution of the United States:  Questions & Answers, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & 
REC. ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_q_and_a.html (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
 38. See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1834–47 
(2009); Kent, supra note 30, at 505–24; Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters:  
The Court’s Fateful Turn in Ex parte Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REV. 153, 
169–211 (2013). 
 39. In the eighteenth century, “[i]n its broadest usage, the law of nations comprised the 
law merchant, maritime law, and the law of conflicts of laws, as well as the law governing 
the relations between states.”  Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early 
American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 821–22 (1989).  Thus, the law of nations differed 
from the common law, even though prominent British jurists taught that “the law of nations 
. . . is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of 
the land.”  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *53. 
 40. 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 484–86 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, 2d ed. 1836) (statement of James 
Madison). 
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B.  New Originalism’s Approaches to Unwritten Limits on the 
Constitution’s Domain 
Because new originalism treats the understanding of the Constitution of 
“any contemporaneous speaker of the English language” as equally 
important to that of a Madison or Hamilton,41 new originalism seems likely 
to produce quite different results than old originalism on some interpretive 
questions.  Take the example of the Due Process Clause.  Using the 
contemporary dictionaries, which many new originalists favor as a first-
order aid to interpretation, we find “person” defined in a comprehensive and 
ordinary manner as, simply, a man or woman.42  Using an intratextual 
method favored by some new originalists, we might note that the 
description of the rightholder in the Due Process Clause (“person”) is 
linguistically broader than other terms used in the document, for example 
“citizen” or “the People,” which is seemingly a reference to the American 
people who the Preamble tells us ordained and established the Constitution.  
Several of the state constitutions promulgated in 1776 and thereafter 
contained due process–type clauses that could be read as limiting the class 
of rightholders to citizens of the particular state or perhaps of the United 
States.43  Read against the background of these documents, the term 
“person” in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment might have 
seemed, linguistically, to be a much broader and hence more encompassing 
term. 
Putting all of this linguistic evidence together, and reading it in the 
context of the background premise that the new Constitution made the 
granting of power inextricably linked with limitations on power, it seems 
plausible that an ordinary member of the American public circa 1789 would 
have read the Due Process Clause to protect the rights of men and women—
full stop.  Thus, the Constitution’s domain—or at least the domain of its due 
process protections, since we would still need to examine the specific 
linguistic meaning of other parts of the text—might be universal. 
But in fact, few, if any, of the men involved in framing and ratifying the 
Constitution would have understood “person” in the Due Process Clause 
this way.  In giving us the linguistic or semantic meaning that a word or 
 
 41. Balkin, supra note 27, at 653. 
 42. See, e.g., GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY 705 (J. Morgan ed., London, W. 
Strahan, J. Rivington & Sons, 10th ed. 1782) (“Person”:  “A man or woman . . . .”); WILLIAM 
PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 389 (London, W. Strahan, J. & F. 
Rivington, 1st Am. ed. 1788) (“Person”:  “a man or woman . . . .”); THOMAS SHERIDAN ET 
AL., A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 713 (Phila., William Young, 6th 
ed. 1796) (“Person”:  “Individual man or woman; one’s self.”). 
 43. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XII (“[N]o subject shall be arrested, 
imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the 
protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of 
his peers, or the law of the land.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII (“[N]o member of this 
State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any the rights or privileges secured to the subjects 
of this State by this constitution, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his 
peers.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII (“[E]very member of society hath a right to be 
protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property . . . .”). 
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phrase should or would have had to the Founding-era public, new 
originalism might well produce an incomplete or misleading view of the 
meaning of this Clause, and how the Framers or ratifiers would have 
expected and understood this clause to fit within the U.S. Constitution and 
the broader legal framework. 
New originalists might have a number of possible responses to the claim 
that their method could produce a reading of the domain of the Due Process 
Clause that relatively few people intimately involved in adopting the 
Constitution would have accepted.  Each response has some merit, but none 
is entirely satisfying. 
1.  Terms of Art 
Was “person” a term of art?  Most, if not all, new originalists assert that 
terms of art must be given their specialized meaning.44  But to prevent a 
word’s meaning from becoming untethered from the ordinary public 
meaning, many new originalists suggest that we ought to give terms of art 
their narrow technical meanings only if it is somehow apparent that they are 
terms of art.45  Thus, new originalists can comfortably say that the ordinary, 
objective public meaning of Article I, Section 8’s vesting of power in 
Congress to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal” was its technical legal 
meaning.46  But what about the very next power given to Congress:  to 
“make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”47  Every one of 
those words seems like quintessentially ordinary, everyday, nontechnical 
English.48  It is unclear on what basis new originalism could maintain that 
the objective meaning of those words for an ordinary member of the public 
would encompass a specialized understanding of the law of nations and 
military practice that the drafters of the language brought to the 
Constitution-writing project.49 
The term “person” in the Due Process Clause also seems like 
quintessentially ordinary, nontechnical English.  Law dictionaries of the 
Founding period did not tend to have any separate definition for “person,” 
 
 44. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 815, 818; Solum, supra note 9, at 970. 
 45. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 44, at 818; Solum, supra note 13, at 34–35. 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See generally Ilya Somin, Originalism and Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
625, 651–52 (2012) (“If a phrase in the Constitution looks like a technical term, ordinary 
citizens might assume that it is a legal term of art that they can leave to the experts to 
interpret. . . .  By contrast, it is unlikely that citizens would make a similar assumption about 
plain language provisions of the Constitution, which include such ordinary sounding terms 
as ‘Equal Protection,’ ‘liberty,’ ‘property,’ and ‘Commerce . . . among the several States.’  In 
some cases, these seemingly ordinary terms could still have a technical meaning for legal 
experts.  But it is unlikely that members of the general public—even ‘reasonable’ ones—
would have understood them in that way.”). 
 49. See generally Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1683 
(2009) (tracing the meaning of the language used in the Clause “through British and Colonial 
Admiralty documents, prominent works of international law, the Revolutionary War and 
Articles of Confederation, and the drafting and ratification of the Constitution”). 
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which might have suggested to an average member of the reading public 
that the word did not have a specialized legal meaning.50  I am not 
convinced that it is properly considered a term of art within the new 
originalist framework. 
2.  Contextual Meaning 
Some new originalists have a different way of accommodating non-
obvious, specialized meanings that certain words would have had to the 
adopting generation.  Solum, for example, says that the original public 
linguistic meaning of the text to an ordinary member of the public can be 
interpreted by “resort to those aspects of the framing and ratification of a 
given constitutional provision that would have been available to the general 
public.”51  He elsewhere calls this “the publicly available context of 
constitutional utterance,” and notes that it includes knowledge about things 
like the government created by the Articles of Confederation and the basic 
facts of the British legal system.52  The underlying premise is quite similar 
to the justification for giving terms of art a technical legal meaning:  it 
would have been somehow obvious in the public culture of the Founding 
period that certain words have specialized meaning because of connection 
to important public facts and debates. 
That strikes me as a reasonable methodological move when the alleged 
“context” is something that was widely discussed and understood by 
average members of the late eighteenth-century public.  But it seems 
difficult to justify qualifying or trumping broad constitutional text by 
reference to unwritten rules of the common law and the law of nations 
unless, for example, a prominent legal or political event or widely 
distributed public statement by a leading figure can reasonably be supposed 
to have brought the issue to the fore. 
3.  The Choice of Broad Language Was a Delegation to the Future 
New originalists might make another response to the problem I raised, 
contending that when the Constitution uses words that have a very broad 
semantic meaning, even if unwritten norms of common law or the law of 
nations might have been intended or understood to limit their domain 
during the Founding generation, fidelity to the document and the idea of 
limited government under a written constitution requires us to follow the 
broad semantic meaning.  New originalists generally distinguish between 
 
 50. See, e.g., 2 RICHARD BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 206 (John Burn ed., London, 
T. Cadell 1792) (containing no separate entry for “person”); JOHN COWELL, A LAW 
DICTIONARY 339 (Great Britain, J. Walthoe et al. 1727) (same); 2 TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, 
NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY, OR, GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 511 
(London, J. Rivington et al., 3d ed. 1783) (same). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Plausibility of Personhood, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 19–32 (2013) (arguing that “person” in the 
Due Process Clause was a term of art and is best read to encompass unborn human 
embryos). 
 51. Solum, supra note 13, at 25. 
 52. Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted). 
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original public meanings and original expected applications, and assert that 
only the former are binding.  If a meaning is extremely broad, so be it.  As 
Jack Balkin and others emphasize, “we should pay careful attention to the 
reasons why constitutional designers choose particular kinds of 
language.”53  If they chose narrow, precise language, it is “because they 
want to limit discretion” in the future; on the other hand, a choice of broad 
language is a choice to “delegate details to future generations,” to allow 
future generations to apply the concept within the outer boundaries set by 
the broad language used in the document.54 
Since I assume this is not a backdoor way of smuggling in original intent, 
it cannot be a descriptive claim about the intent of particular constitution 
drafters or adopters.  It would seem, therefore, to be a presumption 
requiring justification, such as a normative one.  I think it quite likely that if 
Framers and ratifiers in 1787–88 thought that the Due Process Clause 
would be interpreted to provide protections to all persons no matter their 
citizenship, territorial location, or enemy status, many of them would 
probably have demanded that a more precise and restrictive term be used 
instead of “person.”55  And if we strongly suspect that is true as a historical 
matter, then it would seem somewhat off the mark to rely on standard 
normative defenses of originalism to justify interpreting potentially broad or 
vague language as being intended to convey that kind of very capacious 
discretion to the future.  It is somewhat difficult to understand how using 
originalism in this way constitutes “fidelity”56 to word choices by the 
adopting generation and therefore supports popular government by tying the 
people’s agents to the choices made by the people.57 
4.  Vagueness Allows Nonoriginalist Construction 
A related potential response of new originalism is that the Due Process 
Clause’s term “person” is, like many important parts of the Constitution, 
very vague and underdeterminate.  As a result, “interpretation” of the 
original public meaning will only produce a “thin,” “framework” kind of 
semantic meaning of the term, while a meaning “thick” enough to give 
some truly determinate content to the constitutional provision can only be 
produced by nonoriginalist “construction.”58  In most cases, this form of 
argument is quite plausible.  Indeed, it represents one of the major 
theoretical advances of new originalism over the old, though it does come, 
as Thomas Colby has noted, at the expense of originalism’s claims to 
 
 53. BALKIN, supra note 9, at 6. 
 54. Id. at 6–7. 
 55. But maybe not.  Sometimes broad or vague language in constitutions or statutes is 
used to paper over irreconcilable differences among the adopters. 
 56. See BALKIN, supra note 9, at pt. I (discussing “Fidelity”). 
 57. See Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 
VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2007) (“[T]he most common and most influential justification for 
originalism [is] popular sovereignty and the judicially enforced will of the people.”). 
 58. See Balkin, supra note 27, at 646–47. 
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provide a determinate method that reins in judicial subjectivity.59  But when 
we turn to the example of “person” and potential limits from the common 
law and the law of nations, there is a hitch.  It is a cardinal rule of new 
originalism that construction may not contradict interpretation—that is, 
construction may occur only within boundaries demarcated by 
interpretation.  Above, I suggested that the semantic meaning of person 
might be “human being” (or perhaps “adult human being”).  If so, a 
construction using background rules of general law to read “person” to 
mean, for example, “adult human being who is a U.S. citizen or, if not, is 
present in the United States and whose home country is not at war with the 
United States,” would seem to impermissibly undercut the broad, 
unrestricted semantic meaning, not merely flesh it out and specify it. 
5.  Continuity with the Preexisting Legal System 
A fifth approach to the problem that text-focused new originalism might 
seem to produce a meaning that would have been rejected by many 
members of the adopting generation is presented in an interesting recent 
article by Stephen Sachs.60  The claim is that the Constitution was adopted 
to be part of an ongoing legal system, and that it generally is unproblematic, 
because this is how our legal system worked, to think that provisions of the 
Constitution were defeasible—that is, could be defeated or limited by 
preexisting unwritten rules of the common law or the law of nations.  This 
is an old idea.  For instance, the debates in the Supreme Court’s first 
blockbuster case, Chisholm v. Georgia,61 touch on it.  Justice James Iredell 
assumed in dissent that the preexisting sovereign immunity of the states 
under the law of nations and common law survived under the new 
Constitution,62 while the justices in the majority thought that the broad text 
of the new Constitution’s Article III trumped.63 
Sachs’s basic presumption often appears, like Iredell’s, to be continuity:  
the Constitution was overlaid on a legal system that was already a going 
concern, and so would have been generally understood to fit comfortably 
within the rules of that preexisting legal system, including rules that 
defeated otherwise broad and unlimited constitutional language.64  As a 
general matter, it is clearly true that the Constitution fit within an ongoing 
legal system.  The Constitution did not purport to be a new code that would 
displace all prior law.  But, at least in some instances, any presumption of 
continuity would be mistaken.  As Martin Flaherty, Jack Rakove, and other 
historians have emphasized, the Constitution emerged from a time of 
revolutionary change, and represented such an extraordinarily new form of 
government that many details were not thought about, much less worked 
 
 59. See Colby, supra note 9, at 714. 
 60. Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813 (2012). 
 61. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 62. Id. at 435, 449 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
 63. See, e.g., id. at 466 (opinion of Wilson, J.). 
 64. See Sachs, supra note 60, at 1817. 
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out.65  Even the meaning of the concept of a “constitution” was debated 
vigorously and changed significantly over the Revolutionary War and 
Framing periods.66  The revolution went well beyond views about 
government.  Gordon Wood, for example, after documenting the huge 
changes in views about the proper constitution of government that occurred 
over a short period of time,67 then turned to writing about the 
“momentously radical” changes in views about the social order during the 
Revolutionary War period.68  Instability and discord marked debates about 
interpretation of the Constitution.  Caleb Nelson has documented how the 
radical newness of the Constitution generated unresolved disagreement over 
what kinds of preexisting interpretive presumptions should be used to 
construe it.69  Saul Cornell’s contribution to this Symposium shows that 
elite versus populist debates about interpretive method raged during the 
Founding era, with the former groups advocating that the Constitution 
should be read as a technical legal document employing usual lawyerly 
presumptions and conventions, whereas the latter groups argued for a plain 
meaning interpretation according to the understandings of the uneducated 
common man.70 
It is plausible to think that the limits and qualifications of the common 
law and the law of nations were understood by the public of the Founding 
era and later generations to have been silently incorporated into the 
Constitution, limiting its otherwise unqualified rights-bearing language.  
Indeed, I have previously made such an argument.71  But it also strikes me 
as plausible to think that the new Constitution—especially given its new 
Bill of Rights with a new judiciary to enforce it, and its structure premised 
on the idea that enumeration presupposed limitation—could have been 
understood to be a new birth of freedom, overriding or at least modifying 
previous background norms that had limited the rights of aliens, military 
enemies, and nonresidents. 
So if Sachs and others who make this argument are offering a descriptive 
claim about how the Constitution would have been understood, a 
presumption of continuity with the past will not do.  Empirical investigation 
 
 65. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 171–72, 189 (2004); Rakove, supra note 13, at 588, 592. 
 66. Rakove, supra note 13, at 589–92. 
 67. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 (1969). 
 68. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, at ix (1991). 
 69. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 
555–56, 560–78 (2003). 
 70. Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas:  
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 738–39 
(2013); see also Nelson, supra note 69, at 570 (“During the debates over ratification . . . 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists divided over whether one should read the Constitution like a 
lawyer at all, or instead should understand the document as a layman would.”); H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 902–13 
(1985) (describing battles between Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the proper 
interpretative methods for reading the Constitution). 
 71. See Kent, supra note 30, at 492; Kent, supra note 38, at 171–76; Kent, supra note 
31, at 1852. 
770 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
of what the public of the Founding era actually thought about how specific, 
unwritten rules of nonconstitutional law would interact with specific parts 
of the new Constitution is necessary, as Sachs’s analysis of some specific 
issues makes clear.  But this raises two problems of its own.  First, it 
appears to be more of an original intent or original understanding argument 
than a new originalist argument about objective public meaning.  The 
second difficulty is discussed in the next subsection. 
6.  Original Methods Originalism 
A sixth possible new originalist approach to our problem is suggested by 
the work of John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, which they call 
original methods originalism—ascertaining the original public meaning by 
employing the background interpretive rules that the adopting generation 
would have thought applicable.72  It is possible that there were one or more 
background rules that might have helped elucidate the relationship between 
the common law, the law of nations, and the Constitution. 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory is attractive in a number of respects.  
Compared to a new originalism that has the potential to allow semantic 
meaning to depart dramatically from the expectations of the adopting 
generation, original methods originalism better respects the choices of the 
adopting generation, avoiding what might be called a bait-and-switch 
problem.  McGinnis and Rappaport also avoid a serious potential objection 
by not presuming that any given interpretive rule is applicable; the 
applicability of any rule is rather an empirical question about the 
understandings of the adopting generation.73  But the theory has some 
difficulties answering the problem I am posing. 
We are talking now about discovering unwritten rules about how 
unwritten sources of law, like the common law or the law of nations, would 
interact with the new Constitution.  But, in practice, it is exceedingly 
difficult to pin down a majority, much less a consensus view, on a specific 
question when there is neither:  (1) written text to serve as a focal point of 
debate and to clarify what exactly adopters were being asked to accept or 
reject; (2) actual or hypothetical cases to sharpen the debate and crystallize 
the issues; nor (3) a decision point that forces or at least allows many 
different people to go on record with their views.  It seems to me that, in 
this situation, we are faced with the same type of methodological 
problems—how to know unexpressed intent and determine collective intent 
or understandings, and in any event, a lack of necessary written records to 
do so—that many think made original intent and original understanding 
originalism unworkable.  Determining the intended, understood, expected, 
or commonly held meanings of the Constitution’s textual provisions is 
difficult enough, even though both (1) and (3) existed to help us understand 
the adopting generation’s views.  It seems quite unlikely that today’s 
interpreters will routinely be able to discover sufficient consensus in the 
 
 72. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25. 
 73. Id. at 769, 783, 787. 
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adopting generation about the relationship between unwritten rules of 
general law and the Constitution’s text.74 
7.  Defining the Audience of Speakers and Readers 
A final possible response of new originalism might be to define the 
audience whose linguistic practices count as one which is both familiar with 
the common law and the law of nations and with how those preexisting 
bodies of law would fit in with the new Constitution.  If made, this 
question-begging move would be an extreme example of why Larry 
Alexander and other critics of new originalism suggest that there is no 
“non-arbitrary way of choosing” what characteristics and views the chosen 
audience of speakers has.75 
Old originalists presented different accounts of whose intent or 
understanding mattered:  drafters, ratifiers, or the public at large.76  
Similarly, new originalists do not agree about who makes up the group that 
is the measure of objective public meaning.  As noted above, for some new 
originalists, including Barnett, it is simply a “reasonable” or “reasonably 
well-informed” person in late eighteenth-century America.77  For Solum, it 
is “ordinary American citizen[s] fluent in English,” such as “farmers, 
seamstresses, shopkeepers, and even lawyers.”78  Other new originalists 
posit somewhat different groups whose linguistic practices are the measure 
of meaning.  McGinnis and Rappaport’s reasonable person is apparently 
one who was aware of the background interpretive rules that would have 
been understood to apply to legal documents like the Constitution.79  For 
Michael Ramsey, the relevant group is “educated and informed speakers of 
the time.”80  For Gary Lawson, it is a hypothetical person who is “fully 
informed” and “know[s] all that there is to know about the Constitution and 
the surrounding world.”81 
These differences can matter a great deal in the foreign affairs area.  The 
public meaning for Lawson or McGinnis and Rappaport would likely 
incorporate relevant rules of the common law and the law of nations, while 
the less sophisticated audience of speakers that Barnett, Solum, and others 
 
 74. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 731, 784–85 (2010) (“Our whole constitutional history shows that in many instances 
several ‘public understandings’ existed. . . .  Moreover, circa 1788, many Founders in fact 
believed that they had not yet established a fixed meaning for many parts of the 
Constitution.”). 
 75. Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:  
ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 87, 89 n.6 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 
2011). 
 76. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 250–52 
(2009). 
 77. See BARNETT, supra note 9, at 92. 
 78. Solum, supra note 13, at 3. 
 79. John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles As the 
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 374 (2007). 
 80. Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism, 73 MO. L. REV. 
969, 975 (2008). 
 81. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002). 
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look to likely would not.  As far as I can tell, new originalism has yet to 
provide a satisfactory account of how to choose its actual or  hypothetical 
audience whose linguistic usages and practices are the measure of meaning. 
III.  NEW ORIGINALISM AND THE IMPERFECTLY DRAFTED 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONSTITUTION 
In recent years, originalism has become methodologically self-conscious 
and sophisticated; voluminous materials on the ratification of the 
Constitution have been made easily available to researchers, and a large 
number of academics have devoted themselves to originalist projects.  
Before all this, it was said by leading scholars of foreign affairs law that the 
Constitution’s text appears to leave unanswered many foreign affairs 
questions.82  But now, even after all the modern developments, many 
important foreign affairs law questions are still contested, difficult, and 
uncertain.  The drafters and ratifiers did not fully work out their thinking 
and, hence, the Constitution’s text is often poorly drafted or incomplete.83  
And some of the foreign affairs parts of the Constitution were written in a 
loose way that is a poor fit for new originalism’s parsing of the precise 
meaning of specific words and clauses in the Constitution, based in large 
part on dictionaries, grammar books, and popular usage.  Both of these 
factors make it difficult for new originalism to settle on a clear and 
uncontested original public meaning of many foreign affairs provisions. 
A.  The Declare War Clause 
An example might help to start the discussion.  Mark Tushnet recently 
observed, in criticizing any originalism that claims to isolate a single 
historical meaning of constitutional language, “give me an interesting term 
used in a constitution, and I will find a bunch of people at the time of its 
adoption who understood it to mean one thing, and a bunch of other people 
who understood it to mean something else.”84  My experience in reading the 
primary sources of the Founding era has confirmed the truth of this remark. 
With one exception.  Article I gives Congress the power to declare war,85 
grant letters of marque and reprisal,86 and raise and maintain armies and 
navies,87 while Article II makes the President the “Commander in Chief” of 
U.S. armed forces.88  A vast array of members of the Founding generation 
 
 82. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:  OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957, at 
171 (4th rev. ed. 1957); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 14–15 (2d ed. 1996); HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
CONSTITUTION 68 (1990). 
 83. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 159–60 (1996); Flaherty, supra 
note 65, at 171–72, 191; William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
983, 986, 999, 1002 (2009). 
 84. Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 611 (2008). 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12–13. 
 88. Id. art. II, § 2. 
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opined without dissent that the Constitution had thereby empowered 
Congress alone to decide whether to initiate foreign wars.89  Yet some 
significant modern academics believe that the original meaning of the 
Constitution is that the president has the authority to initiate foreign wars 
because the declare war power merely authorized Congress to proclaim that 
an international state of war existed, with all its attendant legal 
consequences.90  Still other modern scholars believe that the original 
meaning of the Constitution was unclear on who possessed war initiation 
authority.91  President Truman most famously, as well as a number of other 
modern presidents, acted on the basis of a modern pro-president 
understanding.92 
What happened?  In part, the felt necessity for expansive presidential war 
powers in the modern era may have subtly influenced the scholarship on 
this issue—”ought” created “is.”  But a large part of the reason for the 
divergence between the unanimous views of the Founders and the 
understandings of some modern academics is, I submit, that the drafters at 
Philadelphia did not do a great job making their unanimous intentions clear 
in the text.  Both the Declare War Clause and Article II’s provisions 
concerning executive powers were drafted quickly and debated relatively 
little.93  Just looking at the Constitution’s plain text from a semantic or 
 
 89. Major figures whose views about this issue are essentially beyond dispute include 
George Washington, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, John Marshall, James Wilson, 
Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, William Paterson, James Monroe, Pierce Butler, James 
Iredell, Samuel Chase, Henry Knox, and Charles Pinckney.  On the other hand, I am not 
aware of a single instance in which a prominent member of the Founding generation 
expressed the view that the Constitution authorized the president to decide whether to initiate 
a foreign war. 
 90. The most important works in this vein are by John Yoo. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Clio 
at War:  The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169 
(1999); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means:  The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996); John C. Yoo, War and the 
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1643–44 (2002).  Other academics share 
similar views. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Erosion of the President’s Power in Foreign Affairs, 
68 WASH. U. L.Q. 693, 698 (1990); Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law:  The 
War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833, 850–51 (1972); Philip Bobbitt, War Powers:  An 
Essay on John Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility:  Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and 
Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1375–83 (1994) (book review); Robert F. Turner, 
War and the Forgotten Executive Power Clause of the Constitution:  A Review Essay of John 
Hart Ely’s War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 903, 906–10 (1994) (book review). 
 91. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and 
the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2057–58 (2005); Stephen L. Carter, The 
Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 111 (1984). 
 92. See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 99–100 (2d ed. 2004). 
 93. See Treanor, supra note 83, at 999 (“[T]he records of the Philadelphia Convention 
indicate that the language vesting in Congress the power to ‘declare war’ was more a product 
of delegates’ dissatisfaction with the original proposal that Congress should have the power 
to ‘make war,’ rather than a considered conception of what the power to ‘declare war’ 
meant.  Their focus was on why ‘make war’ was a bad approach, rather than on why ‘declare 
war’ captured their intended meaning.”); Forrest McDonald, Foreword to CHARLES C. 
THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789, at xiv (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2007) 
(1923) (stating that by the time Article II powers were being drafted “the Convention was 
nearing an end, and the delegates were tired, irritable, and eager to go home.  As a 
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linguistic standpoint, it is not obvious that the grant of a power to “declare 
war” conveys all war initiation powers to Congress.94  The competing 
view—that it was authority to proclaim an international state of war—
seems to me and many other observers a textually plausible one. 
Excellent work by Michael Ramsey and Saikrishna Prakash has shown 
that a likely original meaning of “declaring war” was “initiating a state of 
war by a public act, and it was understood that this could be done either by 
a formal declaration or by commencing armed hostilities.”95  But, in my 
view, that interpretation trumps the competing one primarily on the strength 
of the unanimous testimony of the founding generation and evidence of the 
purposes that animated the drafting96—in other words, evidence of original 
intent or original understanding, not the objective linguistic meaning of the 
text. 
This raises an interesting question.  Why, for years after the Constitution 
was adopted, do we not see any interpreters saying, “I know what the 
Framers intended to say regarding war powers, but the semantic meaning of 
the text that was adopted is consistent with some presidential power to 
initiate war, so that is what the Constitution means”?  There are probably at 
least two reasons.  First, and less interesting for present purposes, there was 
probably not much of a political constituency that desired presidential war 
initiation authority.  Presidents Washington and Adams, for example, were 
both comfortable with Congress taking the lead.  Second, as William 
Treanor has argued, it is not clear “that the original meaning of the text is 
determined by reading the document closely” in the manner of 
contemporary text-based originalists.97  Treanor suggests that many early 
constitutional interpreters were not strict textualists in the modern style but 
rather focused on “the larger purposes underlying the text” and “[s]tructural 
concerns.”98  William Eskridge has made similar arguments about early 
statutory interpretation.99  The structural considerations and purposes in 
 
consequence, they became a bit careless in finishing their work.  Article II, establishing the 
executive branch, was therefore put together in a slipshod fashion.”). 
 94. See generally Robert W. Bennett, Originalism:  Lessons from Things That Go 
Without Saying, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 650–51 (2008) (arguing that important parts of 
the Constitution were sloppily drafted or incomplete, and that certain important issues were 
entirely unaddressed). 
 95. Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1545 
(2002) (emphasis omitted); see also RAMSEY, supra note 5, at 222–35; Saikrishna Prakash, 
Unleashing the Dogs of War:  What the Constitution Means by “Declare War,” 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 45 (2007); Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History in the War Powers Debate:  A 
Reply to Professor Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1685 (2002). 
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favor of sole congressional war initiation authority were so well known and 
widely accepted that it would likely have seemed outlandish to read the text 
any other way. 
This is not to say that text was irrelevant.  Anyone reading the ratification 
debates of 1787–88, or congressional debates, lawyers’ arguments, and 
judicial decisions after the Constitution went into effect will find 
innumerable instances of careful reading of the Constitution’s text coupled 
with the assumption that the textual meaning is binding.  But the Founding 
era’s textual analysis was, at least for some important interpreters and in 
some instances, slightly but significantly different than today’s text-based 
new originalism. 
B.  Immigration and Unenumerated Powers 
The immigration power and debate about unenumerated, inherent 
legislative authority provides another example of ways the foreign affairs 
Constitution was incomplete and poorly drafted, and how its text was 
sometimes interpreted in a looser way than text-focused new originalism 
might assume. 
It has long been noted that the Constitution lacks a clear textual basis for 
full congressional control over immigration.  Some aspects of an 
immigration power may be implied from the Naturalization Clause, the war 
powers clauses, the Foreign Commerce Clause, or perhaps even the 
Migration and Importation Clause, but Congress regulates a vast array of 
immigration-related matters and not all can be easily implied from these 
other substantive powers.  The Supreme Court has for well over a century 
resolved this problem by holding that Congress’s authority to 
comprehensively regulate immigration comes either wholly or in part from 
extraconstitutional, inherent powers of sovereignty or international law 
instead of from any textually enumerated or implied power.100 
A terrific book by Ramsey applying new originalist methods asserts that 
this understanding lacks any basis in the original public meaning of the 
Constitution.101  (Interestingly, Justice Scalia accepts the inherent 
immigration powers argument102—perhaps an example of his 
faintheartedness.)  According to Ramsey, the Vesting Clause of Article I 
and the Tenth Amendment rather clearly state that there are no inherent, 
extraconstitutional legislative powers of the national government, and that 
 
and ordinary usage; they also involve policies chosen by the legislature and enduring 
principles suggested by the common law, the law of nations, and the Constitution.”). See 
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Debate Between Originalists and Non-Originalists, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1905, 1916–17 
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Founding generation to read the Constitution).  Treanor’s and Eskridge’s views are not 
universally accepted. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 25, at 793–96. 
 100. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659–60 (1892); Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–05 (1889). 
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all powers not granted to the national government are reserved to the 
states.103  Ramsey also notes that many prominent Federalists publicly 
defended the proposed Constitution by assuring the people that the national 
government only possessed those powers that the text enumerated or clearly 
implied, and that all others remained with the states.104  As a result, any 
legislative power over immigration not granted to Congress by the text 
would be reserved to the states.105 
Ramsey’s reading of the text is highly plausible, and his reporting of the 
ratification debates entirely accurate.  I think it is clear that he has captured 
an original public meaning of the text.  But is it the only original public 
meaning? 
Compared to other issues, the Framers did not spend as much time 
thinking about or drafting foreign affairs parts of the Constitution,106 for at 
least two reasons.  First, the foreign affairs provisions of the Articles of 
Confederation were considered to be the most successful, the least in need 
of repair or wholesale change, and so were largely copied over from the old 
document to the new and given to the national government.107  Certainly, 
many Framers thought that new foreign affairs provisions were needed, but 
these were largely additions to the Articles, not subtractions—for example:  
making treaties and other federal law the supreme law of the land, creating 
new federal courts to enforce treaties and the law of nations, creating a 
separate executive branch, granting to Congress new legislative power over 
foreign commerce and the law of nations, as well as new direct powers of 
taxation to fund the national government.  The new document split foreign 
affairs powers held by the Continental Congress between wholly new 
institutions:  a Congress, its upper house, a president, and federal courts.  
Probably less attention was devoted to dividing powers between these 
institutions than the importance and complexity of the topic warranted.  
Second, the Framers shared more common goals and ideas about foreign 
 
 103. RAMSEY, supra note 5, at 17, 199–201. 
 104. Id. at 17–18. 
 105. Id. at 202–04. 
 106. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The War Powers Outside the Courts, 81 IND. 
L.J. 1333, 1339–40 (2006) (stating that the Declare War Clause “was not a first order issue” 
for the Philadelphia Convention and so the Framers “fashioned a text that neither fully 
captured their intentions nor resolved the types of issues that have become pressing to us”). 
 107. It was not until relatively late in the Philadelphia Convention that the enumeration of 
the legislative powers emerged.  Before then, the convention was satisfied with the following 
principles:  “That the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative Rights 
vested in Congress by the Confederation”—i.e., authority to control war and foreign 
affairs—“and moreover to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and 
also in those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmony 
of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation.” 2 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131–32 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).  
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Section 8. See Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for 
Protecting Rights:  The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 373–74 (2007). 
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affairs than many domestic issues.108  As a result, foreign affairs issues 
generally received less time and attention and the Framers did not reach 
consensus in their conceptions or achieve specificity in the text for many 
separation of powers questions.109  I am, of course, not saying that there 
was no controversy, debate, or attention to foreign affairs matters, for of 
course there was.110 
As Treanor writes, “the way in which the Constitution was drafted—
often at great speed and with many critical questions unresolved”—may 
“suggest[] the appropriateness of an open-ended interpretive process that 
considers many variables and does not limit the analysis to text.”111  How 
might the rather hastily drafted foreign affairs portions of the Constitution 
have looked using a looser, more structure- and purpose-focused manner of 
reading text than some new originalists do today? 
Although the principle of enumeration as limitation was central to the 
Federalists’ defense of the Constitution, many also believed that the 
Constitution that emerged from Philadelphia had given the national 
government enormous and nearly unlimited power in foreign affairs, and 
certainly enough power to accomplish all purposes for which the federal 
government existed.  As Mark Graber has explained,  
When Federalists spoke about federal authority, they consistently asserted 
that the federal government had the power to meet all national 
concerns. . . .  Few Federalists thought seriously about the legal 
significance of enumerated powers because they still preferred 
constitutional politics to constitutional law as the best means for 
restraining national officials.112 
Thus, prominent Framers declared that the Constitution they had written 
created a government that would, in Hamilton’s words, “contain in itself 
every power requisite to the full accomplishment of the objects committed 
to its care.”113  John Jay described the Constitution as forming a “national 
government, competent to every national object.”114  Hamilton explained: 
As the duties of superintending the national defence and of securing the 
public peace against foreign or domestic violence, involve a provision for 
casualties and dangers, to which no possible limits can be assigned, the 
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power of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the 
exigencies of the nation and the resources of the community.115 
Madison agreed that the Convention had drafted “a Constitution fully 
adequate to the national defence and the preservation of the Union,” and 
that “[t]he means of security”—the powers granted to the federal 
government by the Constitution for national defense—“can only be 
regulated by the means and the danger of attack,” that is, must be 
essentially unlimited.116  Because “[i]t is in vain to oppose constitutional 
barriers to the impulse of self-preservation,” the Philadelphia Convention 
had not attempted to do so.117  As Graber describes it, “Proponents of 
ratification in 1787 and 1788 indiscriminately combined assertions that 
federal powers were limited with assertions that Congress was authorized to 
regulate all matters of national importance.”118 
In other words, a case might be made that the Constitution was 
understood by some to have granted more foreign relations and national 
defense powers to the federal government than parsing the strict semantic or 
linguistic meaning of its words would seem to convey.  I should emphasize 
that I am only sketching the outlines of this argument here, not claiming to 
have conclusively documented it. 
There are some indications in the years after the Constitution was 
adopted that this looser way of reading the Constitution was in play.  Soon 
after the Constitution was ratified and the new government was up and 
running, it became clear that a careful textual exegesis of the foreign affairs 
Constitution revealed some gaps.  But some Federalists did not see this as 
problematic because of the widely shared assumption that the national 
government had been granted by the Constitution every power necessary to 
accomplish its ends, which included national defense and foreign relations.  
So early on, the power to punish sedition, to regulate immigration and 
deportation, and to acquire new territory were said by some to be derived 
from the general nature and powers of the powerful federal government 
created by the Constitution to manage foreign affairs and defend the 
nation.119  This understanding was subtly but importantly different from the 
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claims heard later in the nineteenth century that the national government 
possessed some wholly unenumerated, extratextual foreign relations powers 
merely by virtue of sovereignty or international law.120  The earlier idea 
was that the vesting of foreign affairs and national defense powers in the 
national government had been so complete and exhaustive that 
unmentioned powers of that nature that served the same purposes could be 
considered impliedly granted.  This implication arose perhaps from the 
overall structure and purposes of the document, or perhaps from broad 
clauses like the Preamble’s statement that the Constitution was formed to, 
among other things, “provide for the common defence,” or the Article I, 
Section 8 grant of authority to Congress to tax and spend for the common 
defense.121  This is similar—not identical, but similar—to what Chief 
Justice John Marshall later did in McCulloch v. Maryland.  After noting that 
“[t]his government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated 
powers,”122 he nevertheless proceeded to read the enumerations in a broad 
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and general way and held that in creating such a government of awesome 
powers, the People, through the Constitution, intended to grant Congress 
ample means to carry out the great objectives of the union.123 
I am not arguing that the original public meaning of the Constitution’s 
text was that Congress possessed inherent, unenumerated powers in foreign 
affairs and national defense.  My point is more narrow:  for some important 
Founding-era interpreters, a reading of the Constitution based strictly on the 
semantic meaning of the specific enacted clauses was insufficient, because 
it failed to account for what they understood to have been the vesting by the 
Constitution of all necessary foreign affairs and national defense powers in 
the federal government.  How prominent this reading was is an empirical 
question.  My sense—I have not exhaustively tried to research and 
document this—is that Ramsey’s reading of the text was more common and 
influential than the alternate one I have sketched here.  But a complete 
account of the original public meaning of the text should encompass all of 
the many contested views and indeterminacies.  In my opinion, a strict 
textualism does not provide a fully satisfactory account. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article is the work of an interested observer rather than a partisan in 
the intense methodological disputes within the various originalist camps 
and between originalists and their critics.  I do not think originalism is all 
“bunk.”124  In fact, I have several times attempted to uncover the original 
meaning of parts of the Constitution because I think that it is a crucially 
important aspect of constitutional interpretation.125  But I am skeptical of 
originalism’s claim to be the sole legitimate method of interpretation. 
This skepticism is not so much philosophical as practical.  Just as no 
previous prophet or church has ever succeeded in convincing all of 
humanity that he, she, or it represents the one true faith, I think it is 
inevitable that there will continue to be a very wide diversity of 
methodological approaches used by all the various kinds of people who 
interpret and apply the Constitution—private lawyers, judges, executive 
branch advisers, members of Congress and their staffs, state and local 
officials, public intellectuals, participants in social movements, and 
ordinary Americans. 
Participating in a public discourse about the Constitution’s meaning, 
therefore, requires speaking the languages of the many different methods of 
interpretation—including, of course, new originalism.  This is particularly 
true in the foreign affairs area where, as noted in the Introduction to this 
Article, the Supreme Court and the political branches tend not to be very 
originalist. 
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In addition, new originalism and its method of parsing the objective 
semantic meaning of the enacted text struggle to interpret certain foreign 
affairs aspects of the Constitution.  Because of its focus on the meaning of 
the written text to an audience of  ordinary Americans, the method has 
trouble explaining when and whether unwritten doctrines of the common 
law and the law of nations should be understood to limit otherwise broad 
language in the Constitution.  And new originalism arguably commits the 
“aesthetic fallacy”126 when it fails to grapple with the fact that many foreign 
affairs provisions of the Constitution were written hastily, sloppily, and 
incompletely, and were not interpreted by many members of the founding 
generation in a modern, strictly textualist manner. 
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